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Abstract
Various accounts of cognition and semantic
representations have highlighted that, for some
concepts, different factors may influence cat-
egory and typicality judgements. In particu-
lar, some features may be more salient in cate-
gorisation tasks while other features are more
salient when assessing typicality. In this paper
we explore the extent to which this is the case
for English spatial prepositions and discuss the
implications for pragmatic strategies and se-
mantic models. We hypothesise that object-
specific features — related to object properties
and affordances — are more salient in categori-
sation, while geometric and physical relation-
ships between objects are more salient in typi-
cality judgements. In order to test this hypoth-
esis we conducted a study using virtual envi-
ronments to collect both category and typical-
ity judgements in 3D scenes. Based on the
collected data we cannot verify the hypothe-
sis and conclude that object-specific features
appear to be salient in both category and typi-
cality judgements, further evidencing the need
to include these types of features in semantic
models.
1 Introduction
Various accounts of cognition and semantic repre-
sentations have highlighted that, for some concepts,
different factors may influence category and typi-
cality judgements (Smith et al., 1974; Rips, 1989).
In particular, some features may be more salient in
categorisation tasks while other features are more
salient when assessing typicality. In this paper
we explore the extent to which this is the case for
English spatial prepositions and discuss the impli-
cations for pragmatic strategies and semantic mod-
els. We hypothesise that object-specific features
— related to object properties and affordances —
are more salient in categorisation, while geomet-
ric and physical relationships between objects are
more salient in typicality judgements. In order to
test this hypothesis we conducted a study using
virtual environments to collect both category and
typicality judgements in 3D scenes. Based on the
collected data we cannot verify the hypothesis and
conclude that object-specific features appear to be
salient in both category and typicality judgements,
further evidencing the need to include these types
of features in semantic models.
The spatial prepositions we analyse are those
considered to have a functional component as well
as those prepositions that seem to act as their ge-
ometric counterpart. For the ‘functional’ preposi-
tions, object affordances and functional relation-
ships, such as support and location control, ap-
pear to be salient (Garrod et al., 1999; Coventry
et al., 2001) compared to the geometric counter-
parts where geometric features and relative posi-
tions of objects appear to be more salient. In En-
glish, we consider the functional prepositions to be:
‘in’, ‘on’, ‘over’ and ‘under’; and their respective
geometric counterparts to be: ‘inside’, ‘on top of’,
‘above’ and ‘below’. We also consider ‘against’ to
be a functional preposition (Talmy, 1988), without
a clear geometric counterpart.
To clarify the distinction between category and
typicality judgements, we suppose that a category
decision is when an entity is labelled with a cate-
gory or concept and, though priming and context
may certainly be factors, the judgement is not made
in direct comparison with another entity. For ex-
ample, a categorisation judgement occurs when an
agent is asked whether ‘the apple is in the bowl’. In
order to reply, the agent judges the membership of
the instance in the relevant category and the wider
context plays a relatively minor role.
Typicality usually refers to the extent to which
an entity is a good example of a concept — how
similar it is to some ideal conceptual representation.
In our study we ground the notion of typicality
in comparison and preference — an entity, x, is
more typical of a category than entity y if, when
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x is compared with y, people in general pick x
as a better category member. For example, when
requested to pick ‘the apple in the bowl’, an agent
must compare a set of candidate objects for how
well they fit the description.
By assessing typicality in this way we distin-
guish the notion of typicality from graded cate-
gory membership. The typicality data that we col-
lect does not arise from graded membership judge-
ments where study participants are asked to assign
a value of how well the concept fits the category,
e.g. in (McCloskey and Glucksberg, 1978; Hamp-
ton, 1997), but instead from tasks in which partici-
pants select the best fitting instance from a given
description.
In existing models of spatial language (and se-
mantic models more generally), it is generally as-
sumed that the underlying semantics of categorisa-
tion and typicality are essentially the same. How-
ever, as we will discuss in Section 4, appropriately
distinguishing categorisation and typicality judge-
ments is important when generating and processing
referring expressions.
2 Background
Following various criticisms of definitional rep-
resentations of concepts in human cognition
(Wittgenstein, 1953), Rosch’s Prototype Theory
(Rosch, 1978) provided an approach based on fam-
ily resemblance which does not presuppose that
concepts have necessary and sufficient conditions
for making category judgements. By relying on a
degree of resemblance to some prototypical notion
of a concept, category membership in this account
may be treated as a matter of degree. With such
an account it becomes appealing to conflate the no-
tions of categorisation and typicality — the more
an entity resembles a prototype the more likely it
is to be labelled with the category and the more
typical it is. There are however various accounts of
concept analysis which suggest that category and
typicality judgements are fundamentally different.
Smith et al. (1974) consider the influences of
category decisions and propose a model to account
for experimental findings. Central to the model is
the ‘characteristic feature assumption’, which sup-
poses that features vary in the extent to which they
define a concept. Smith et al. suppose that there
is a distinction in types of features — ‘defining’
features which strongly influence category judge-
ments and ‘characteristic’ features which strongly
influence typicality judgements — and give the ex-
ample of ‘robin’ to illustrate this. For the concept
‘robin’, ‘have wings’ is an important defining fea-
ture relating to the categorisation of an entity as ‘a
robin’, while ‘perches in trees’ is a characteristic
feature which relates to how typical an entity is of
‘a robin’.
Rips (1989) argued that categorisation of some
entity is more than simply a judgement of how
similar the entity is to some typical representation
of the category. Rips provides support for this in an
experiment where participants are asked to imagine
an object of a given size and are asked which of
two concepts, A,B say, the object is more similar
to and which the object is most likely to be. For
the given concept pairs, e.g. ‘pizza’ and ‘quarter’,
the hypothetical object may be considered more
similar to one of the concepts yet more likely to
be the other. In the case of the pizza and quarter, a
round object with a three inch diameter is regarded
as more similar to a quarter as pizzas are rarely so
small, but more likely to be a pizza as the size of a
quarter is generally fixed and is less than 3 inches.
This issue is explored further in (Osherson and
Smith, 1997) where it is again argued that concept
membership and typicality are distinct phenom-
ena. Based on a study in (Berlin and Kay, 1991),
Osherson and Smith argue that the notions differ
using the seemingly extreme example of the con-
cept ‘red’, even though it may be hard to imagine
distinct defining and characteristic features for a
concept with such simple semantics. However, the
noted difference in judgements arises as people
recognise particular wavelengths of light as being
unambiguously red yet less typical than prototypi-
cal red. This difference in judgements preserves a
monotonic relationship between category and typ-
icality judgements i.e. if an entity, x, is a better
category instance than y, then it is not less typical
than y.
We believe that such monontonicity results offer
a trivial case which may be explained without any
fundamental modification of the underlying seman-
tics or how they are processed. In the simple case
of the colour red, we may represent the semantics
in both categorisation and typicality judgements
by considering the dominant wavelength — an in-
stance is more or less typical and a better or worse
category instance based on the similarity of the
dominant wavelength to prototypical red and the
distinction in category and typicality judgements
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is explained via a threshold which is applied in
category judgements.
However, in the case of spatial language, the
semantics are more complex and are influenced
by a variety of geometric, functional and object-
specific features. We believe that as a result, the
relationship between typicality and categorisation
may in fact be non-monotonic — there may be
instances of a spatial preposition, i1, i2, such that
i1 is a better category member but less typical than
i2.
2.1 A note on terminology
Regarding the names of the objects being discussed
we use figure (also known as: target, trajector, refer-
ent) to denote the entity whose location is important
e.g. ‘the bike next to the house’ and ground (also
known as: reference, landmark, relatum) to denote
the entity used as a reference point in order to lo-
cate the figure e.g. ‘the bike next to the house’. We
call potential figure-ground pairs configurations.
2.2 Object-Specific Features
It is apparent that various object properties and af-
fordances influence the categorisation and usage
of spatial prepositions (Coventry et al., 1994; Feist
and Gentner, 1998). For example, the animacy of
the figure object may influence a decision to use
‘in’ or ‘on’1 (Feist and Gentner, 1998). Follow-
ing (Coventry et al., 1994), we call these features
‘object-specific’ features.
We believe that these types of features provide a
source of disagreement between category and typi-
cality judgements and below for each of the func-
tional prepositions we describe the object-specific
features that are explored in this paper.
In As ‘in’ expresses a notion of containment, the
ability of the ground to contain the figure is of-
ten salient whether or not the ground does in fact
contain the figure in a geometric sense. Therefore,
whether the ground is a type of container appears
to be salient for ‘in’ (Coventry et al., 1994; Feist
and Gentner, 1998; Richard-Bollans et al., 2019)
and this may be considered a salient object-specific
feature.
Over/Under ‘over’ and ‘under’ appear to have
a ‘covering’ sense which is closely related to the
functions of the figure and ground (Coventry et al.,
1People were found to prefer ‘in’ when describing an inan-
imate figure (a coin) and ‘on’ when describing an animate
figure (a firefly).
2001; Tyler and Evans, 2001; Mori, 2019). For ex-
ample, a covering object like a lid may exhibit this
sense of ‘over’ when covering a container. There-
fore, whether or not the figure is a covering object
or the ground is a type of container may be salient
object-specific features.
There is also a non-covering sense where a spe-
cific functional interaction exists between part of
the figure and ground. For example, a tap may be
‘over’ a sink if only the spout of the tap is above the
sink. Similarly, an object may be ‘under’ a lamp
when the object is not under the lamp in a geomet-
ric sense but the light from the lamp shines on the
object. These specific functional interactions rely
on particular properties of the figure or ground and
so we consider them to be object-specific features.
Relating to the functional interactions of the fig-
ure and ground, an intermediary object between
the figure and ground may serve to block any func-
tional interaction, as studied in (Coventry et al.,
1994), and diminish the effect of any object-specific
features which are present.
Against ‘against’ is commonly used to denote
contact between two objects and as argued in (Her-
skovits, 1987) is more applicable in situations
where the ground object is fixed and the figure
is mobile. For example, one may describe a chair
as being ‘against a wall’ but it would be odd to
describe a wall as being ‘against a chair’.
On ‘on’ is ubiquitous in the English language
and is applied to many situations where usually
at least one of the following hold: the figure is
supported by the ground, the figure is above the
ground or the figure is in contact with the ground.
As a result, it is not clear that there are particular
properties of figure or ground objects at table-top
scales which create strong preferences for ‘on’.
As discussed above, the preposition ‘in’ is often
preferred when the ground object is a container.
‘on’ is therefore used less frequently in these sce-
narios (Feist and Gentner, 1998), even though the
physical relationships between the objects often ful-
fil the requirements for ‘on’. As a result, whether
or not the ground is a container appears to be a
salient object-specific feature for ‘on’.
Finally, ‘on’ may be used to denote attachment
of the figure to the ground. It is therefore plausible
that, similarly to ‘against’, ‘on’ is more applica-
ble in situations where the ground object is fixed
relative to the figure.
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3 Hypothesis
Our main hypothesis is that categorisation and typ-
icality judgements may differ for spatial preposi-
tions in the following manner: given configura-
tions c1, c2 and preposition P , participants may
be more likely to categorise c1 with P yet more
likely to select c2 as a better instance of P . We
hypothesise that this may arise in part because
particular features are salient in category judge-
ments which become less salient in typicality judge-
ments. Note that under this hypothesis the relation-
ship between categorisation and typicality is non-
monotonic, making this in a sense stronger than
the findings related to ‘red’ discussed by (Osherson
and Smith, 1997).
In general, we expect that object-specific fea-
tures will be more salient in categorisation while
geometric and physical relationships, such as con-
tainment or support, will be more salient in typical-
ity judgements.
Furthermore, we believe that this particular dis-
tinction may be more pronounced for the functional
prepositions than for their geometric counterparts.
This would be somewhat a corollary of the assump-
tion that functionality in general is more salient
for the former, for which tentative evidence is pro-
vided in (Richard-Bollans et al., 2020a) for these
prepositions and (Coventry et al., 2001) in the case
of ‘over/above’ and ‘under/below’.
4 Generating & Understanding
Referring Expressions
In this section we discuss the motivation for this
investigation and the possible implications of a
significant distinction between category and typi-
cality judgements. In particular, we consider the
ramifications for the field of Referring Expression
Generation and Comprehension (REG/C), where
noun phrases are used to identify entities e.g. ‘the
box under the table’.
Humans often prefer brief ambiguous descrip-
tions over lengthy unambiguous descriptions (Ro-
hde et al., 2012), and expressions involving spa-
tial prepositions often fulfil this desire for brevity.
For example, rather than referring to objects based
on elaborate visual attributes like ‘the yellow cup
with two pink dots on it’, humans often refer to
objects using simple locative expressions, say ‘the
cup next to the stapler’. We also see many exam-
ples of expressions containing spatial prepositions
in the SemEval-2014 corpus (Dukes, 2014) and the
HuRIC corpus (Bastianelli et al., 2014), both of
which consider natural language commands given
to robots.
To explain why a distinction in category and typ-
icality judgements is important in these scenarios,
suppose we have a speaker and listener, intended
referent, r, set of distractor objects2 and suppose
that the speaker is generating a description, D.
When the speaker generates an utterance in or-
der to refer to r, there are various semantic and
pragmatic considerations they must make. A naive
model of such a speaker may simply find a concept
within its vocabulary which is most suitable for r.
This would clearly be a flawed strategy, however,
as there may be other entities in the scene which
better fit the concept — an expression may be true
but not satisfy the speaker’s communicative goals
and so pragmatics must be considered. A more re-
fined speaker model may find a description which
best distinguishes r from the distractor objects in
O, similar to the algorithm of (Dale, 1989) which
aims to maximise the discriminatory power of a
description while minimising superfluous informa-
tion.
It appears that the speaker must model how well
an object fits a description compared to other ob-
jects (typicality judgement) and how well a descrip-
tion fits an object (category judgement). Further,
it is apparent that humans will reason recursively
about possible intentions of speakers and possible
interpretations of listeners (Goodman and Frank,
2016), making these judgements also necessary for
listeners.
Let us consider a more concrete example. Sup-
pose we have a scenario as in Figure 1 where a
bowl, b, is on a table and there is one cube, cred,
in it and one cube, cblue, next to and not touching
it. It seems plausible that humans are more likely
to categorise the configuration (cblue, b) with the
preposition ‘near’ than the configuration (cred, b)
even though when comparing the configurations
humans may agree that cred is more ‘near’ the bowl
than cblue.
Suppose a speaker gives an utterance ‘the cube
near the bowl’ in order to refer to cblue which an
agent must interpret. As may be expected, seman-
tic models, e.g. (Platonov and Schubert, 2018), are
likely to assign a better score for ‘near’ to (cred, b)
than (cblue, b). If the system has a crude strategy
2A distractor object is an object in the scene which the
speaker is not intending to refer to.
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Figure 1: An example of possible confusion when not
accounting for object-specific features.
for interpretation which simply selects the configu-
ration with the highest semantic score, then such a
system would erroneously select cred.
Many systems with more sophisticated prag-
matic strategies, e.g. (Golland et al., 2010), have
been developed which aim to take into account and
reason with the possible utterances available to the
speaker. In this case, such a system may correctly
select cblue if it recognises that other better utter-
ances would have been available to the speaker if
the intended referent was cred. ‘the cube in the
bowl’ would be a clear example of such an utter-
ance which seems to clearly identify cred over cblue.
However, supposing that our hypothesis is correct,
we contend that this marked distinction is not sim-
ply a matter of typicality and the fact that it would
be unusual to categorise (cred, b) with ‘near’ is more
salient than any distinction in typicality between
the two configurations. As cred is not ‘in’ the bowl
in an ideal sense we can imagine that a semantic
model based simply on the physical relationships
between the objects may provide a more marked
distinction between the configurations for ‘near’
than for ‘in’. In this case, ‘the cube in the bowl’
wouldn’t necessarily seem like a better utterance to
identify cred than ‘the cube near the bowl’.
Moreover, even if typicality on its own works
well for REC, understanding and modelling the
differences between categorisation and typicality
is important for producing natural utterances in
REG. For instance, suppose the speaker creates an
utterance where r is more typical for the concept,
C say, in D than any of the distractor objects. If
categorisation is not aligned with typicality, such
a strategy may produce unusual utterances where,
though r is typical for C, it is uncommon to cat-
egorise r with C. Such unnatural utterances may
trigger unwanted conversational implicatures and
be a source of confusion. For example, the utter-
ance ‘the ball on the bowl’ in the context of Figure
1 would be an unusual way to describe the ball as
the preposition ‘in’ is often used with objects such
as bowls. From this unconventional usage of ‘on’
a listener may imply that for some reason ‘in’ was
not suitable e.g. if the speaker is actually referring
to another unseen ball. The issue of producing nat-
ural utterances has been recognised by others in the
field (Krishnaswamy and Pustejovsky, 2019) and
is an important challenge to overcome if we are to
develop more sophisticated REG systems.
With regards to existing models of spatial lan-
guage, it is generally assumed that the underlying
semantics of categorisation and typicality are es-
sentially the same. For example, in the PRAGR
mechanism proposed in (Mast et al., 2016) a prag-
matic strategy is presented which aims to maximise
both the acceptability and discriminatory power of
a description. Acceptability is calculated using
similarity to a prototype based on physical relation-
ships while the discriminatory power is calculated
considering the acceptability of the description for
the referent compared to other distractor objects.
5 Data Collection
In order to investigate typicality measures and cat-
egorisation judgements in detail, we conducted a
study which is described below. Collected data,
details of the framework and results of the analysis
can be found in the Leeds research data repository.3
The latest version of the data collection environ-
ment and code for analysis can be found in the
GitHub repository.4
5.1 Environment & Tasks
The data collection framework is built on the
Unity3D5 game development software, which pro-
vides ample functionality for the kind of tasks we
implement. Two tasks were created for our study —
a Categorisation Task and a Typicality Task. The
former allows for the collection of categorical data
while the latter provides typicality judgements.
In the Categorisation Task participants are shown
a figure-ground pair (highlighted and with text de-
scription, see Figure 2) and asked to select all
prepositions in the list which fit the configuration.
Participants may select ‘None of the above’ if they






Figure 2: Categorisation Task
Figure 3: Typicality Task
Often categories and concepts are viewed as an-
tagonistic entities; for example work on Conceptual
Spaces is often concerned with comparison of cat-
egories, e.g. partitioning a feature space (Douven
et al., 2013). We believe however that the vague-
ness present in spatial language is so severe that it
is not clear that a meaningful model distinguishing
the categories is possible. For this reason, partici-
pants in our studies are asked to select all possible
prepositions for a configuration rather than a single
best-fitting preposition.
In the Typicality Task participants are given a de-
scription and shown two configurations, see Figure
3. Participants are asked to select the configuration
which best fits the description. Again, participants
can select none if they deem none of the configura-
tions to be appropriate.
In order to minimise differences in the tasks that
may elicit different conceptualisations of objects in
the scenes, the phrasing of the descriptions is the
same in both the Categorisation Task and Typicality
Task e.g. both tasks use the definite determiner ‘the’
and objects are referred to by their colour.
5.2 Scenes
We hypothesise that object-specific features
strongly influence category decisions while the ge-
ometric ideals associated to the prepositions are
more salient in typicality decisions. Scenes are
therefore created for each preposition which vary
the degree to which these object-specific features
are present and also vary how similar the relational
aspects of the configurations are to the geometric
ideals associated with the given preposition. For
example for the preposition ‘in’, we have a scene
where the ground is a container and the figure is
not very well contained in it and a scene where the
ground is not a type of container but the figure is
well contained in it. In this case, if the hypothesis is
correct, we would expect a preference for categori-
sation in the former and a preference for typicality
in the latter.
We have created 18 virtual 3D scenes each
containing a single highlighted figure-ground pair.
Four scenes each were created for ‘in’, ‘on’, ‘over’
and ‘under’ and these scenes were also shared with
their respective geometric counterparts: ‘inside’,
‘on top of’, ‘above’ & ‘below’. Two scenes were
created for ‘against’. In the Typicality Task, par-
ticipants compare scenes/configurations associated
with the preposition given in the description.
5.3 Study
The study was conducted online and participants
from the university were recruited via internal mail-
ing lists along with recruitment of friends and fam-
ily.6 Each participant performed first the Categori-
sation Task on 6 randomly selected scenes and then
the Typicality Task on 15 randomly selected scenes,
which took participants roughly 5 minutes. 30 na-
tive English speakers participated providing 180
annotations in the Categorisation Task and 447 an-
notations in the Typicality Task.
As the study was hosted online, we first asked
participants to show basic competence. This was
assessed by showing participants two simple scenes
with an unambiguous description of an object. Par-
ticipants are asked to select the object which best
fits the description. If the participant makes an in-
correct guess in either scene they are taken back to
the start menu.
6 Results
In this section we use the collected data to test the
hypothesis and conclude that we cannot verify the
hypothesis. We propose that this is because object-
specific features are in fact salient in both category
and typicality judgements and provide examples to
support this.
6University of Leeds Ethics Approval Code: MEEC 19-
030. Participants were recruited without incentive.
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Figure 4: The bin under the table
6.1 Comparing Categorisation & Typicality
To analyse the collected data, we consider pairs
of tested configurations for each preposition and
evaluate the degree to which category and typical-
ity judgements differ. For each pair, (c1, c2), we
first decide whether c1 is a genuinely better cate-
gory instance than c2 or is more typical than c2.
To do this we simply use a hypothesis test with
significance level 10% and null hypothesis that the
given configurations are equally likely to be la-
belled with the preposition (in the category case)
or equally likely to be selected (in the typicality
case). In the category case the p-value is calcu-
lated using the one-tailed version of Fisher’s exact








× 0.5N , where N is the number
of times the pair is tested and C1,2 is the number
of times c1 is selected over c2. In 22 out of the 49
given pairs, one of the configurations is a signifi-
cantly better category instance or is more typical
than the other.
Considering the somewhat trivial case, similar to
the case of ‘red’ discussed in Section 2, where two
entities are both unambiguous cases of a concept
but one of the entities is more typical than the other;
there is one instance of this in our dataset. For the
preposition ‘under’ the configurations shown in
Figures 4 & 5 were both always labelled with the
preposition, out of seven tests in the former and ten
tests in the latter, but the (bin, table) configuration
in Figure 4 is significantly more typical than the
(notepad, lamp) configuration in Figure 5. As pre-
viously discussed, however, this is an unsurprising
result.
Regarding the main hypothesis of this paper,
there are no pairs of configurations in our dataset
where one of the configurations is a significantly
better category member and the other is signifi-
cantly more typical. Moreover, in only nine pairs
is there any possible disagreement where one of
Figure 5: The notepad under the lamp
the configurations is more often labelled with the
preposition and the other configuration is more of-
ten selected in the Typicality Task — in all but
one of these cases neither configuration is a signif-
icantly better category member or is significantly
more typical. We therefore cannot conclude that
our hypothesis is correct and it appears that the
notions of categorisation and typicality do not sig-
nificantly vary due to object-specific features —
these appear to be both defining and characteristic
features.
Clearly we have only tested a small number of
features and there are a vast array of salient fea-
tures for each preposition for which the hypothesis
may still be correct. However, our results suggest
that object-specific features are salient in both cat-
egorisation and typicality judgements — in some
cases the object-specific features appear to have a
stronger influence than the physical relationships.
Interestingly, there is some tentative evidence that
this extends in general to the geometric counter-
parts and suggests that these prepositions are not
purely spatial — supporting findings in (Dobnik
and Ghanimifard, 2020).
6.2 Importance of Object-Specific Features
In the following we provide some examples from
our dataset which highlight the importance of
object-specific features.
On For the preposition ‘on’, the (mug, pencil)
configuration in Figure 6 is both a significantly
better category member and is significantly more
typical than the (pear, bowl) configuration in Fig-
ure 7. Regarding the physical relationships, (pear,
bowl) appears to be a better example of ‘on’ than
(mug, pencil). If we consider the usual salient fea-
tures for ‘on’:
• The pear is fully supported by the bowl, while
the mug is leaning on both the pencil and the
table
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Figure 6: The mug on the pencil
Figure 7: The pear in/on the bowl
• There is a high degree of contact between the
pear and the bowl compared to the mug and
pencil
• The entirety of the pear is above some part of
the bowl, while the bottom of the mug is level
with the bottom of the pencil
We therefore believe this result is not due to
the physical relationships of (mug, pencil) better
representing ‘on’ than (pear, bowl) and that this
result arises primarily because ‘on’ is generally
not used for containers. One may have expected
this result if the objects in the experiments were
named — ‘on the bowl’ sounds strange while ‘on
the pencil’ seems more plausible. It is therefore
even more surprising given that the objects were
not named in a way that influences the decisions.
In/Inside For the prepositions ‘in’ and ‘inside’,
the (pear, bowl) configuration in Figure 8 was more
likely to be selected in the Typicality Task than
the (cube, shelf) configuration in Figure 9. If we
measure containment simply as the degree to which
one object is contained in the bounding box or
convex hull of another, as is common in grounded
semantic models e.g. (Chang et al., 2014; Platonov
and Schubert, 2018), then the cube would be fully
contained by the shelf whereas the pear is not even
partially contained by the bowl.
It therefore appears that the role of the bowl as
Figure 8: The pear in the bowl
Figure 9: The cube on/in the shelf
a type of container is influencing typicality judge-
ments for both these prepositions.
Over/Above For the preposition ‘over’, the (tap,
sink) configuration in Figure 10 is both a signifi-
cantly better category member and is significantly
more typical than the (lid, pan) configuration in Fig-
ure 11. The same is true for the preposition ‘above’,
though in this case the results are not significant.
Again, the physical relationships of (lid, pan)
appear to better capture the geometric meanings of
‘over’ and ‘above’ than (tap, sink). There is also
some functional interaction between the objects in
both cases — lids are used to cover pans and sinks
are placed below taps to catch the water. The pref-
erence for the (tap, sink) configuration is therefore
Figure 10: The tap over the sink
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Figure 11: The lid over the pan
somewhat surprising.
However, the lid does not appear to be prop-
erly fulfilling its functional role, as it is not fully
covering the container part of the pan. This may
explain the preference for (tap, sink) and further
highlight the importance of considering functional
interactions based on usual object usages.
7 Discussion
Regardless of the hypothesis, these results high-
light the importance of including object-specific
features in semantic models of spatial language.
With the possible exception of (Platonov and Schu-
bert, 2018), these types of features are rarely in-
cluded in semantic models and many systems are
developed in block-world type environments, e.g.
(Spranger, 2013; Mast et al., 2016; Perera et al.,
2018), where these types of features are not needed.
One approach to improving semantic models
may be to incorporate information from knowledge
bases such as ConceptNet (Speer and Havasi, 2012)
or AfNet (Varadarajan and Vincze, 2012). For ex-
ample, from ConceptNet one can determine that
lids are used for covering and that bowls are con-
tainers. Another approach is to leverage affordance
detection systems, e.g. (Do et al., 2018), which
use information from the scene to predict object
affordances.
In (Rodrigues et al., 2020) some object-specific
features, e.g. whether or not the ground is a
type of container, are taken to distinguish sepa-
rate polysemes.7 By leveraging previous work
on modelling the polysemy of spatial prepositions
(Richard-Bollans et al., 2020b), it may be possi-
ble to incorporate object-specific features into a
semantic model by using these features to distin-
guish polysemes. In order to carry this out, further
7A word is said to exhibit polysemy where the word has
multiple related senses. Each of these senses is called a pol-
yseme.
work identifying salient object-specific features for
each preposition would be beneficial and a larger
dataset is needed which provides more instances
of prepositions representing a greater variety of
object-specific features.
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